Neo-liberalism,
reformism, populism and ultra-leftism
PART TWO
IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGES WITHIN THE PEOPLE’S CAMP IN SOUTH AFRICA, REFORMISM, ULTRA-LEFTISM AND POPULISM
Unlike liberalism (and its modern variant, neo-liberalism), and unlike, say,
Marxism-Leninism (and its many variants) - “reformism”, “ultra-leftism”
and “populism” are not, per se, an identifiable body of ideas. They are,
rather, styles of approaching political theory and practice. You will find, for
instance, a wide variety of populisms – ranging from ultra-right fascist
populism, through to left and ultra-left variants. Marxism-Leninism will also
be found in reformist, ultra-left and populist variations/deviations.
For these reasons, it is easier, when dealing with reformism, ultra-leftism and
populism, while noting some general features (as we will), to focus on concrete
situations.
But first let us consider some of the general features of these three
tendencies.
The general features of ultra-leftism
The defining feature of ultra-leftism is its excessive exaggeration of subjective
factors. The subjective feelings of militancy of a small group of
revolutionaries; or the deep anger and impatience felt by large masses of
workers and poor; or the attractiveness of an immediate advance to socialism –
important, understandable and, in many cases, even admirable subjective
feelings of this kind are assumed to mean that the desirable is also, more or
less, immediately possible. This is why Lenin, appropriately, referred to this
tendency as “infantile”. He writes, for instance, of the ultra-left tendency
in Germany in 1920:
“It is obvious that the `Lefts’ in Germany
have mistaken their desire, their politico-ideological attitude, for objective
reality. That is a most dangerous mistake for revolutionaries to make.” (Lenin,
“Left-wing” communism – an infantile disorder, Selected Works, p.541)
The excessive subjectivism of the ultra-left also expresses itself in the ways
in which it tends to explain away reverses or difficulties. These, too, are
excessively subjectivised – leaders are “sell-outs” and “traitors”, the masses
are “misled”, or suffering from a “false consciousness”. These accusations may,
or may not have some relevance, but ultra-leftism tends to evoke them all too
hastily.
The flip-side of this excessive subjectivism is that ultra-leftism tends to underrate
or even ignore the objective factors within a given situation. The real and
potential impediments to a rapid advance are discounted. The strength of
opposition forces and the dangers of counter-revolution are neglected. The
objective weaknesses of progressive classes and strata are themselves also
characteristically ignored.
The conflation of what is desirable with what is possible results in adventurism,
a tendency to voluntarism, the advocacy of reckless leaps forward, based on sheer
will-power, that can result in serious defeat and disaster.
As a consequence of all of this, ultra-leftism tends not to understand
revolution as process. Everything is immediate, all-or-nothing, victory or
sell-out. This, in turn, results in many of the zig-zags that are so often a
feature of ultra-leftism, bouts of excessive optimism, followed by depression
and the predictable accusations of betrayal and sell-out. Lenin writes of this
tendency that it “easily goes to revolutionary extremes, but (it is) incapable
of perseverance, organisation, discipline and steadfastness.” (p.520)
Because of its exaggeration of the immediate, ultra-leftism tends, also, to
greatly exaggerate tactics at the expense of strategies. Tactics are elevated
into strategies, and even principles. For instance, ultra-leftism often
rejects compromises on principle. Participation in parliamentary democracy is
sometimes rejected, for all time, and the tactics of a general strike or an
insurrectionary seizure of power are counter-posed to any other approach, and
turned into timeless strategies if not principles.
The ultra-left approach is also often characterised by what Lenin neatly
described as the “tactics of sheer negation”. We see signs of this in our own
current reality (anti-globalisation, anti-NEPAD, anti-ANC government).
All of these characteristics of ultra-leftism result in a general inability to
appreciate or participate in the often long-haul of organisational building and
the concomitant need to work patiently, resolve secondary contradictions, and
manage the complexity of mass movements, alliances and broad fronts. As a
result, the organisational practices of ultra-leftism are typically
characterised by factionalism and the propensity to endless splitting and
fragmentation (which is why, incidentally, the 2002 ANC S&T Preface attempt
to present the ultra-left as a vast South African conspiracy with global
tentacles is not only factually incorrect, but simply bizarre). Another related
feature of ultra-leftism’s inability to build organisation is a propensity to
enter into a parasitic relationship with established organisations,
institutions and campaigns, using the tactics of entryism.
These are the characteristic features of the ultra-left tendency. We have tried
to show that these features are inter-connected and mutually reinforcing. In
real life, of course, ultra-leftism will manifest itself in many varieties, and
with varying degrees of “purity”.
In South Africa, ultra-leftism has had a
presence over many decades, with all of the endemic characteristics, noted
above, featuring in one way or another. The following are the most recurrent
specific characteristics of ultra-leftism in our country:
The
inability to understand the national question as an objective reality that is a
core feature of South Africa’s capitalist development
path, structurally linked to our deep-seated legacy of under-development.
Instead, ultra-leftism in South Africa tends to conceptualise
the national question, and progressive nationalism, as “false consciousness”,
or inherently “petty bourgeois” – once more subjectivising what is, in the
first instance, a profoundly objective reality.
As a
consequence, ultra-leftism has tended to oppose the entire NDR strategy,
rejecting it as the pursuit of a “capitalist road”, or as a “detour”, an
“unnecessary delay” in the struggle for socialism;
Organisationally,
ultra-leftism has, generally, defined itself outside of and in opposition to
the ANC and the Tripartite Alliance. A great deal of energy
has been devoted to breaking our alliance, to “weaning” workers away from the
“nationalist” ANC, the “Stalinist” SACP, or from the present “reactionary”
leadership of COSATU. But, as with ultra-leftism elsewhere, there have also
been various entryist attempts into all three of the alliance components.
Of course, organised ultra-left factions and groupings are one thing, but there
is also the reality of influence. As in any revolutionary movement, none of our
Alliance formations is immune to the influence of ultra-leftism
on the one hand, or (as we shall soon see) to reformist opportunism on the
other. Labelling and witch-hunting are the least effective ways of countering
such influences.
The general features of reformism
Even when he was focusing his polemical attention on ultra-leftism, Lenin never
forgot that the principal internal danger to a revolutionary movement came not
from the ultra-left, but from reformist opportunism:
“First and foremost, the struggle against opportunism, which in 1914 definitely
developed into social-chauvinism and definitely sided with the bourgeoisie,
against the proletariat. Naturally, this was Bolshevism’s principal enemy
within the working-class movement. It still remains the principal enemy on an
international scale. The Bolsheviks have been devoting the greatest attention
to this enemy.” (ibid., p.520).
This is what Lenin says before going on to deal with ultra-leftism. Not only
does he prioritise the danger of opportunism even when his main topic is
ultra-leftism, but he also affirms that the spread and impact of ultra-leftism
is often directly linked to the damage caused to a revolutionary movement by
reformist opportunism.
“[ultra-leftism] was not infrequently a kind of penalty for the opportunist
sins of the working-class movement. The two monstrosities complemented each
other.” (ibid., p.521)
So what are the main features of reformist opportunism?
Whereas ultra-leftism grossly over-rates the subjective dimension, opportunism
greatly exaggerates the stability, durability, and the “unchallengeable” character
of objective factors. You will find, for instance, this kind of argument in the
2002 intervention of Moleketi and Jele attacking the SACP, which comes very
close to promoting just such an “unchallengeable” version of the current global
balance of forces:
“Capital is stronger than it has ever been, globally. It is in search of and
hopes for a challenger who will have the temerity to launch a general offensive
against it. In crushing such a challenger, as it would, it would not only send
the message that the age of revolutions is over, but would also get the matter
fixed firmly in the minds of the international proletariat that capital,
exclusively, has the right to determine the destiny of the world.” (Moleketi
and Jele, p.15)
Of course, Moleketi and Jele are not wrong to argue that a “general offensive”
against global capitalism could be adventurist, but in the absence of offering
any other line of march against capitalism, it is hard not to be left with the
impression that capitulation is the order of the day. This impression is
reinforced by other passages in their pamphlet, for instance:
“Logically, accumulated capital in the world economy cannot be anywhere other
than with the bourgeoisie, even in our country.” (our emphases, Moleketi and
Jele, p.21)
If accumulated capital resources are privatised, commercialised,
concessioned-out; if the public and parastatal sector is plundered by an
emerging bourgeoisie; if worker pension and provident funds are invested purely
in terms of the logic of the capitalist market and profit maximisation - then
accumulated capital will not be found anywhere other than with the bourgeoisie.
But there is nothing necessary, still less logical about this.
In our view, passages like this illustrate the impact of reformism on the
thinking of some within our movement. In particular, they resonate with the
first and principal feature of reformism, its over-rating of the
“unchallengeable” character of the dominant objective realities.
This is not to say that reformist opportunism does not seek to change things.
But, and this is its second defining feature, it sees change as reforms that do
not challenge the core structural and systemic features of capitalism. Let us be clear, there is nothing wrong
with reforms, but for a revolutionary movement, reforms must have a transformational
character, they must introduce anti-systemic possibilities, momentum towards,
capacity for, and elements of far-reaching structural change. In our situation,
however, reformist opportunism sees change as being about “regulating”
capitalism; modernising our economy; catching up with “international best
practice”; and correcting for “market failure”.
And this results in reformist opportunism sharing with ultra-leftism the
tendency to turn tactical choices imposed by particular realities into
strategies and even into timeless principles. The strategic objectives of one’s
struggle (a national democratic revolution, for instance) tend to be endlessly
postponed, or emptied of substantial content. Ultra-leftism elevates what might
be, in a particular situation, a correct tactical choice (“no compromise”) into
a strategy and even a principle (“never compromise”). Opportunism does exactly
the same thing, but in reverse (“always compromise”). As Lenin puts it:
“Naïve and quite inexperienced people imagine that the permissibility of
compromise in general is sufficient to obliterate any distinction between
opportunism, against which we are waging, and must wage, an unremitting struggle,
and revolutionary Marxism, or communism.” (Lenin, ibid., p.549)
While ultra-leftism tends not to understand process, reformist opportunism does
not understand the DIALECTICAL nature of process. Thus the history and
trajectory of contemporary capitalism tend to be understood as a relatively
smooth, evolutionary flow, rather than a crisis-ridden, thoroughly dialectical
reality in which progress and barbarism, development and underdeveloped are systemically
linked, each the structural condition for the other. In our situation, the
absence of dialectics can result in the unworkable dream of “deracialising” our
society by modernising, applying “international best practice”, aligning with
“global standards”, becoming more competitive, achieving good investment
ratings, and, in short, by “normalising” South Africa in the absence of any
fundamental transformation.
A clear contemporary example of the tendency to obscure the dialectical nature
of key realities in our society is to be found in the “two economies” discussion.
Leading comrades in the movement have, quite correctly, identified the
dualistic character of our economy and society, and they have equally correctly
characterised this as a process of under-development. However, in practice and
in theory, this dialectical reality is often quickly re-conceptualised as “two”
economies – the one developed and the other un-developed. The dialectical
relationship is neglected and a programme of “consolidating” advances in the
“first economy” to produce growth that can be “redistributed” to the second
economy in order to promote it upwards becomes the programmatic vision.
While the posture of ultra-leftism is often one of “sheer negation”, as Lenin
puts it, (anti-globalisation, anti-NEPAD, etc.); the posture of reformist
opportunism tends to be one of bland optimism. The “revolution” is forever
being declared “on track”, as if, precisely, there were some straight-line
“track”.
However, since objective reality (not least a reality dominated by capitalism)
is not evolutionary but thoroughly dialectical, uneven and crisis-ridden,
reformist opportunism frequently finds itself confronted with “discrepancies”.
And so, like ultra-leftism, opportunism tends to have recourse to the subjective
in order to “explain” away obstructions and crises. While ultra-leftism invokes
the subjective “betrayal” of “sell-outs”, reformist opportunism invokes plots
and conspiracies; our continent’s systemic underdevelopment by decades of
capitalist progress tends to be attributed largely to attitudinal prejudices
(Afro-pessimism); the deep-seated structural legacy of racialised poverty is mythologised
(the “demon” of racism); and the motives of journalists and statisticians are
queried when bland optimism is not confirmed by their reports. (We should
emphasise that we are not denying the possibility of plots, nor the fallibility
of statistics or the media, nor the existence of colonial prejudices about our
continent, nor the persistent and abhorrent reality of racism in our society –
but over-reliance on these subjective explanations goes hand in hand with
reformism’s inability to scientifically analyse the contradictory objective character
of our global and national realities.)
The general features of populism –
“Emotive forces”
You will find both reformist and ultra-left versions of populism within the
people’s camp, although there is often a greater affinity between some versions
of ultra-leftism and populism. You will also find (as we have noted above)
other versions of populism – including ultra-right, fascist populism.
In fact, one of the features of populism is that it will often mobilise quite
diverse (and even opposed) ideological currents around a single
issue/personality.
Populism is essentially a tendency that focuses on the emotional mobilisation
of popular forces. While popular mobilisation is essential in any progressive
politics, it runs the risk of becoming merely populist when the long-term
sustainability of the campaign, serious organisation, and the effective
self-empowerment of the popular forces mobilised in the campaign are all
relatively neglected.
Populism tends to mobilise popular forces demagogically as emotional fans of a particular
cause, often of a particular personality. The demagogic mobilisation also frequently
agglomerates a whole series of diverse grievances and unites them around a
single issue or personality – but also AGAINST some demonised arch-enemy – the
“Jews”, “foreigners”, “Osama Ben Laden”
Populism, as the name implies, seeks to mobilise a collective force as “the people”
– there is nothing inherently wrong with the notion of the “people”, of
“popular forces”, of “people’s power”, etc. (Indeed, we have used these terms
in the course of this intervention). However, populism tends to invoke the “people”,
“popular sentiment”, the “nation” etc. in ways that ignore, or deliberately
obfuscate diverse class, gender and other diversities and potential
contradictions within the people’s camp.
While we tend to think of populism in its more militant (whether ultra-left or
ultra-right) variants, there are also more moderate versions of populism – a
politics of personal reassurance, of top-down patronage. If the contradictions
within our society and movement deepen, we can anticipate certain reformist projects
focusing increasing attention on popular unifying projects (2010 for instance?)
to the detriment of more deep-seated challenges and contradictions.
However, the more obvious variants of populism tend to have a militant
character, associated with a politics of “high drama” – whipping up a fever of
emotional sentiment, and playing to the gallery of popular prejudices and
aspirations, or seeking to satisfy some immediate demand, even if it is not
remotely sustainable.
